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Abstract
I prove various results concerning undecidability in weak fragments of Arith-
metic. All results are concerned with S1
2  T1
2  S2
2  T2
2  :::: a hierarchy of
theories which have already been intensively studied in the literature. Ideally
one would like to separate these systems. However this is generally expected
to be a very deep problem, closely related to some of the most famous open
problems in complexity theory.
In order to throw some light on the separation problems, I consider the
case where the underlying language is enriched by extra relations and function
symbols. The paper introduces a new type of results. These state that the rst
three levels in the hierarchy (i.e. S1
2;T1
2 and S2
2) are never able to distinguish
(in a precise sense) the \nite" from the \innite". The fourth level (i.e. T 2
2)i n
some cases can make such a distinction. More precisely, elementary principles
from nitistical combinatorics (when expressed solely by the extra relation and
function symbols) are only provable on the rst three levels if they are valid
when considered as principles of general (innitistical) combinatorics. I show
that this does not hold for the fourth level.
All results are proved by forcing.
1 Bounded Arithmetic
The discovery of abstract set theory was like the discovery of the outer space. Set
theory provides us with a telescope and has undoubtly aected the general view of
the mathematical universe.
This work was initiated in Oxford University England.
yBasic Research in Computer Science, Centre of the Danish National Research Foundation.
1I view Systems of Bounded Arithmetic as a promising framework of studying the
mathematical microcosm. I suggest that questions in complexity theory reside out-
side the macro-world of ordinary mathematics. I belive that most deeper questions
in complexity theory in a strong sense require rened \perception". Many principles
which reside deep down in most mathematical arguments, appear equivalent from the
normal perspective. (Example: Many elementary counting principles, e.g. the dier-
ent versions of the elementary pigeon-hole principle). Through a microscope things
are perceived quite dierent. Certain powerful extensions of Bounded Arithmetic
could provide such a microscope!
Consistency, not truth, is the right starting point when we consider universal prob-
lems. What matters must be deductive powerful viewpoints. Certain extensions of
subsystems of Bounded Arithmetic seems to provide a very promising basis for this.
This paper is the rst in series of planed papers. In these my intension is to iso-
late more and more powerful, (but unsound) systems of Bounded Arithmetic. Notice
that if a universal statement (or more generally a 0-statement)   is proved from a
collection of \false" (in the standard universe N) axioms, which are consistent with
Bounded Arithmetic, then we know a priori that   must actually be true. Because
if   ware false this would be witnessed in the standard part of each model M of
Bounded Arithmetic, and so according to G¨ odels completeness theorem this would
contradict the consistency assumption. This observation also seems to apply to the
conjecture P 6= NP. To see this recall that P 6= NP is equivalent to the statement
that \for all programs P, for all k 2 N, there exists an input x, such that (a) P uses
less than j x jk-steps, and either (b1) accept x but x does not satises 3-SAT or (b2)
P does not accept x, but x is an instance of 3-SAT". Now if the existential quantier
in \there exists an input x" is bounded by some term t,w eo b t a i na 0-formula 
which implies P 6= NP. According to the previous remark, if a (consistent) system of
Bounded Arithmetic (however unsound) proves , then actually P 6=N P .
The idea of renouncing central and \obvious" axioms is certainly not new. We
recall that there are models in which the self evident parallel postulate of Euclidian
Geometry fails, and the wrong principle that each line has many parallel lines-hold
true.
2 Making innite structures nite
We are interested in constructing consistent (but unsound) systems of Bounded Arith-
metic. In this paper I show that there are fragments of Bounded Arithmetic which
have models M in which any countable structure S (up to elementarily equivalence)
2can be elementarily embedded as a \nite" (in the sense of M!) structure.
In this section I will illustrate the basic method of this type of result. Consider the
impossible ideal that any consistent theory  has always a nite model. I show that
there exists a world in which this ideal is realised. In this world the usual induction
axioms only hold for purely existentially dened sets.
Construction: According to the completeness theorem, there is a countable struc-
ture M non-isomorphic, but elementarily equivalent to N, so the same set of L-
expressible sentences holds in the two structures. There must be an initial segment of
M isomorphic to (and identied with) N. Usually the elements in N are called stan-
dard numbers while the numbers in MnN are the so-called \non-standard" numbers.
From an observers perspective outside M (i.e. from our perspective) there exist
\numbers" n 2 M which are innitely large (i.e f1;2;::::;ng) contains innitely many
numbers). However observers inside M would either not be able to express this, or
if we allow them to quantify over second order objects (denable in M)t h e yw o u l d
disagree. These observers of M would believe that f1;2;:::;ng was nite simply
because it would be nite in their universe M, where they have fewer functions and
therefore think more sets are nite! So far all have been folklore. Now the basic part
of the argument runs along lines, similar to those in the proof of Theorem 21 in [12].
Suppose   states that there exists a bijection from some interval f1;2;::;ng to
the universe M. From our outside view f1;2;::::;ng contains innitely (countable)
many numbers, and so our universe must contain a bijection f from f1;2;:::;ng to M.
Suppose now that we actually add a such a map f which maps f1;2;:::;ng bijectively
to M. Suppose also that we extend the language L with an extra function symbol
 f referring to this f. Also assume that we add names for each of the countable
many elements in M. Let us call this new language L  f. Clearly it is not possible for
the model (M;f) to satisfy the principle of induction. However if f is constructed
carefully it turns out that we can force the model to satisfy some amount of induction!
In this example I want to show that one can ensure that (M;f) satises induction
for sets which can be existentially dened by L  f-formulas. First take an outside view.
The model M is countable so there are only countably many existentially dened sets
S1;S 2;::dened by formulas  1(x);  2(x);:::: of one free-variable. List these formulas
such that each formula appears innitely many times in the list. At the kth-step in
the construction consider the formula  k(x), which as an example could be
9u  f(x+ 13) = 2  u:
Suppose that in the previous step f has already been dened on a nite set A 
f1;2;:::;ng with values in B  M.
3We want the least number principle to be true for the formula  k(x). This is done
by \forcing"  k(a) to be true for the smallest possible a, i.e. by letting f(a + 13) be
even for the smallest value a where this is consistent with the fact that f is a 1-1 map.
The conditions a has to satisfy can be expressed in the language L without reference
to  f.S o i n M we are able to search for such an a by a simple search procedure,
which only depends on how f has already been dened on A. From an outside view
\<" does not well order M, so for a moment we take a look at things from inside M.
From this perspective \<" is a well ordering (this is possible because there are fewer
sets in M than in the real universe). So the search procedure must terminate with
some output a. Observers whether inside or outside M, always agree on rst order
properties, in this case, whether a actually is the smallest such element.
Now go back to the real world outside M and proceed to the next step where the
formula  k+1(x) is considered. Again we force  k+1(a) to be true for the smallest
possible a. Alternatively if we cannot force  k+1(a) to be true for any a we know it
will never be true (even at doomsday when f is constructed for all formulas).
We must ensure that f eventually denes the required bijection. In the present
construction this automatically happens. For instance, for each a 2f 1 ;2 ;:::;ng the
formula  (x): =9 y  f( x )=y^x=aeventually forces a to belong to f1;2;:::;ng (if
it does not already do so). The other properties follow for similar reasons.
Now let  be any consistent theory. According to Skolem-L¨ owenheims theorem, 
has a countable model S. If this model is innite we assume that N is the underlying
set. If we in the above construction start o by choosing a countable non-standard
model (M;S M) elementarily equivalent to (N;S), we get a model of existential induc-
tion in which  has a nite (in the sense of M)m o d e l .T h u sw eh a v es h o w n :
Proposition 2.0.1 Any consistent theory  has a model S, which is embedded as a
nite (=bounded) set in some model M.
Actually suppose that L is a countable language which extend the language of
arithmetic, and suppose that L contains undened relation and function symbols for
the language of . Then the model M can be chosen such that it satises the induction
scheme for existential L-formulas.
This shows that any structure S, for example structures of strong systems like set
theory, can be embedded as \nite" sets in some super-structure. It also shows that
we can always assume that a given mathematical domain is \nite" given that our
meta-theory (falsely) believes that all sets (and maps etc) in the universe are purely
existentially dened.
As the pigeon-hole principle fails for innite sets, as a corollary we obtain theorem
21 [12]:
4Corollary 2.0.2 (A.Wilkie, J.Paris) The system I9(f) does not prove that f sat-
ises the pigeon-hole principle.
The results in this paper resemble the ideas just described. However we need to be
more careful.
It follows from the main results that countable structures can always be assumed to
be (up to elementarily equivalence)nite in certain fragments of Bounded Arithmetic.
As we have already indicated this phenomenon is closely related to the fact that the
pigeon-hole principlefails heavilyin these fragments. And it illustratesthe microscope
metaphor. One just has to look through the microscope from the right end!
3 Prelims
First let me recall some basic notations and facts, essentially all from [4]. Let BASIC
denote a nite set of quantier free formulas relating constants, functions and relations
in the rst order language L = L(0;1;+;;jj ;];b
x
2c;;=): Here ] denotes the
function given by a]b =2 j a jjbj where jaj = dlog2(a +1 ) e :An example of a proper
choice of BASIC (without coding functions) can be found in [4]. It is convenient
to add other functions to the language. We will assume that a function (w)x which
takes the value of the xth element in the sequence coded by w is part of the language.
As long as additional functions are polynomially time computable, the results in this
section can be stated with no change.
In the rst order case atomic formulas are of the form t = s or t  s where s;t are
terms in L, while in the (monadic) second order case additionally, atomic formulas
can be of the form t 2 X or X =2 Y .( W h e r e\ = 2 " denotes equality between second
order variables.)
A rst (second) order formula is bounded if all its quantiers are of the form
::::8x  t::: or ::::9x  t::::. Second order quantiers are not allowed in bounded
formulas. Atomic formulas X =2 Y are not allowed because they smuggle in an
unbounded rst order quantier (Extensionality axiom below).
A rst (second) order formula is sharply bounded if it is bounded and all quantiers
are of the form ::::8x j t j ::: or ::::9x j t j :::.
The class of bounded formulas can be stratied as follows: Let b
0 = b
0be the
set of sharply bounded formulas (rst or second order formulas depending on the
context). Let b
i+1 ( b
i +1 ); i  0 be the smallest class of formulas which contains
b
i ( b
i ) and is closed under ^, _, sharply bounded quantication, and bounded
5existential quantication (bounded universal quantication). Notice that, except for
minor syntactical changes, any bounded formula belongs to some b
i and to some b
i.
Finally let strict-b
i+1  b
i+1 denote the set of b
i+1-formulas which are of the
form 9y1  t19y2  t2:::9yr  tr  where  2 b
i. Similarly, let strict-b
i+1  b
i+1
denote the set of b
i+1-formulas which are of the form 8y1  t18y2  t2:::8yr  tr 
where  2 b
i.
3.1 The rst order theories
Let Si
2 denote the rst order theory consisting of BASIC, together with the following
\polynomial time" induction scheme, '(0) ^8 x ( ' ( b x
2c ))' ( x )) )8 x'(x)), where
' 2 b
i. This scheme is usually denoted by b
i-PIND.
Let T i
2 denote the rst order theory consisting of BASIC together with the b
i in-
duction scheme, '(0) ^8 x ( ' ( x ))' ( x+1 ) ))8 x'(x), where ' 2 b
i. This scheme
is usually denoted by b
i-IND.
3.2 The second order theories
The (monadic) second order versions of these theories Si
2()( T i
2(  )) consist of BA-
SIC, b
i-PIND (b
i-IND) together with the extensionality axiom
EXT : 8X;Y (X =2 Y ,8 x ( x2X,x2Y)):
We do not allow the full comprehension axiom, but follow [6] and equip Si
2()( T i
2 (  ))
with the following \NP \ co-NP"comprehension axiom-scheme: (b
1-comprehension)
8x('(x;~ z; ~ Z) ,:  ( x;~ z; ~ Z)) )9 X 8 x( x2X,' ( x;~ z; ~ Z))
where '; 2 b
1.
The underlying logic of these theories is second order predicate logic with second
order equality =2. It is easy to prove that no deductive strength is lost if X =2 Y
is taken to be short-hand notation for 8z(z 2 X $ z 2 Y ), and if EXT and the
equality axioms in the underlying logic are dropped.
3.3 Models of second order theories
A model of a second order theory T is a pair (M; ^ R), where ^ R  P(M); the power
set of M,a n dw h e r eMis a model for the rst order part of T. The satisfaction
relation j= is dened inductively such that second order variables are taken to be the
subsets of M which are in ^ R. The well known main advantage of using this notion of
6a model, without requiring that ^ R = P(M); is that the Compactness Theorem, the
Completeness Theorem and Skolem-L¨ owenheims Theorems hold with minor changes.
These facts follow easily (pointed out by A.J.Wilkiein Personal communication) from
the natural isomorphism:
Observation 3.3.1 (Transitive collapse) Let M4 = M4
num [ M
4
setbe a rst order
model which contains two kinds of elements. One kind(x,y,z,...) denotes numbers and
belongs to M4
num, the other kind(X,Y,Z,...) denotes "sets" and belongs to M
4
set.I f~ 2
is a binary relation on M4, with domain M4
num and range M
4
set such that
M
4 j=( X=Y ,8 x ( x~ 2 X,x~ 2 Y))
then the map  collapse : X −! fx 2 M 4
num : M4 j=" x ~ 2 X " gmaps M
4
set bijectively
onto a class ^ S of subsets of M4
num:
Furthermore (M; ^ S): ( M 4
num;  collapse"M
4
set) is isomorphic to M4.
From this we get the following version of the Completeness Theorem.
Proposition 3.3.2 T [ EXT is consistent if and only if T h a sam o d e l .
T[EXT `  if and only if (M; ^ S) j=  for all models (M; ^ S) j= T:
3.4 Some special results for Si
2()
Now I prove that the second order theories Si
2() are conservative over the corre-
sponding rst order theories, in the sense that any model M j= Si
2 has an expansion
to a model (M; ~ S) j= Si
2(). A similar result holds for the theories T i
2.I p r o v e a
slightly more general result. Let Ψ be a set of formulas  (x), which might contain
free second order variables and free rst order variables other than x.
Denition 3.4.1 By a Ψ-substitution scheme  we will understand a rst order
formula  with no second order variables, which contains meta-variables F1;F 2;:::;Fl.
To eachmeta-variable Fj is associated a term tj.Asubstitution instance ( (x)); 2
Ψ is obtained by replacing each Fj in  with  (tj). |
Example 3.4.2 b
i()-PIND and b
i()-IND are both b
i()-substitution schemes.
Denition 3.4.3 In the following let T(i) =  + BASIC+ EXT, where  is a b
i-
substitution scheme. In T(i), BASIC could be any set of rst order formulas. |
Proposition 3.4.4 If (M; ^ R) j= T(i) there is an expansion ^ S  ^ R such that
(M; ^ S) j= T(i)+ b
1−comprehension:
7Proof: Assume that (M; ^ R) j= T(i) is a given model. Let
^ S = fS  M : 9 i(=  i(x;X1;X 2;:::;Xk)) 2 
b
1;i =1 ;2
^9R1;R 2;:::;Rk 2 ^ R
(x 2 S ,  1(x;R1;R 2;:::;Rk) ,:   2( x;R1;R 2;:::;Rk))g
I claim that (M; ^ S) j= T(i)+ b
1-comprehension. According to proposition 3.3.2
EXT holds in all second order models, in particular (M; ^ S): BASIC holds in (M; ^ S)
because it is a set of rst order formulas. It remains to be shown that (M; ^ S) j=
and to show (M; ^ S) j= b
1-comprehension.
Sub claim 1: (M; ^ S) j= (   ( x )) for all   2 b
i: Notice that if  (x;S1;S 2;:::;Sk)i s
a b
i− formula with set parameters from ^ S,t h e r ei sa b
i− formula (x;R1;R 2;:::;Rl)
with set parameters from ^ R, such that for all c 2 M
(M; ^ S) j=  (c;S1;S 2;:::;Sk) , (c;R1;R 2;:::;Rl):
Here  is obtained from   by the following. First, by replacing each appearance of
Si with either  1(x;R1;R 2;:::;Rr)o r:   2 ( x;R1;R 2;:::;Rr) according to whether Si
appears positively or negatively. Second, by bringing it in a "prenex like" form if
convenient. Now sub claim 1 follows by noticing that
(M; ^ S) j= (   ) , ( M ;^ S )j = (  ) , ( M ;^ R )j = (  )
and that (M; ^ R) j= (  ) is part of the assumption.
Sub claim 2: (M; ^ S) j= b
1− comprehension. Let  1;  2 2 b
1 be given and assume
that for some given a 2 M,( M ; ^ S ) j = 8 x  a (   1 ( x ) ,:   2( x )): Consider S = fx j
 1(x;S1;S 2;:::;Sk)g where S1;S 2;:::;Sk 2 ^ S: As we have already noticed, there are
b
1−formulas 1(x; ~ R)a n d 2 ( x; ~ R)e q u i v a l e n tt o  1and  2, S = fx : 1(x; ~ R)g =
fx : :2(x; ~ R)g2^ S: 2
Corollary 3.4.5 Every model of rst order Si
2;i  1has an expansion to a model
of Si
2():
More generally if U1;U 2;:::;Ur are unary relation symbols added to L, then every
model of Si
2(U1;U 2;:::;Ur), has an expansion to a model of Si
2()
Proof: The rst part of the corollary is just the special case where r =0 . I f
r>0l e tR i := fx 2 M : M j= Ui(x)g and let ^ R := fR1;R 2;:::;Rrg: Notice
(M; ^ R) j= Si
2() − b
1-comprehension, and use proposition 3.4.4 with  as the b
i-
substitution scheme b
i-PIND. 2
Notice that Corollary 3.4.5 remains valid if the theories Si
2 are replaced by T i
2 for
i  1.
83.5 Some conservation results
In [5] S.Buss gave a precise characterisation of the Si
2-provable b
i-denable functions.
Actually one of the major justication for dealing with Si
2 lies in this characterisation.
Let me make an observation in this connection. According to a general argument by
G.Kreisel the class of provable total recursive functions is always insensitive to the
addition of extra universal axioms.
The same argument applies to the class of b
i-denable functions of a theory. The
class is insensitive to addition of b
i-axioms (as long they remain consistent with Si
2).
This is because for a theory T in general:
T + f8x (x)g`8 x 9 y(x;y) ) T `8 x 9 y(x;y)_:  ( y)
which does not produce any new provable total function if (x;y) _:   ( y ) still is
provable equivalent to a b
i-formula. Thus we have
Observation 3.5.1 The class of provable b
i-denable functions of a theory T is
immune with respect to the underlying b
i-theory.
The following immediately gives us the inclusions
S1
2()  T 1
2()  S2
2()  T 2
2()  :::::
Proposition 3.5.2 (S.Buss) S
i+1
2 () ` T i
2() for all i  0.
Proof: Fix an arbitrary (M; ^ S) j= S
i+1
2 (). First notice that if X<bis a b
i-
denable set in M the convex closure Y = conv(X): =f x<bj9 v2Xv 
x ^9 u2Xx  u g is also a b
i-denable set in M.L e t \ d i s t ( Y;Y c)  d"b et h e
 b
1 (b
i)-formula b(d) 9 x;y < b (y − x  d ^ y 2 Y ^ x 62 Y ): By considering
the point b
x+y
2 cobviously S
i+1
2 (R) ` b(d(b
1
2c)k) ) b(d(b
1
2c)k+1)s ob y b
i +1 -P I N D
\ dist(Y;Y c)  b 00 ) \dist(Y;Y c)  b(b1
2c)jbj "a n db ymodus ponens and the fact the
S1
2() ` b(b1
2c)jbj =1\ d i s t ( Y;Y c)  1" .A sY is convex, Y has a smallest element in
M, and then by denition X has a smallest element. As b
i-LNP , b
i-IND we are
done. 2
In some later examples I will use one of the deeper theorems in the subject:
Theorem 3.5.3 (S.Buss) For i  1, S
i+1
2 () is 8b
i+1-conservative over T i
2().
Proof: Suppose that S
i+1
2 `8 ~ x 8~ X 9 ~ zt ( ~ x )  ( ~ x;~ z; ~ X)w h e r e 2 b
i:It suces to
show that T i
2(~ R) `9 ~ zt ( ~ x )  ( ~ x;~ z; ~ R); for   2 b
i:
This follows again by relativising the proof of S.Buss' theorem stating that for
any i  0 S
i+1
2 is 8ndb
i+1-conservative over T i
2; [7] [5]. 2
94 Some nitisation principles
One of our aims is to show that there is a fundamental dierence between S2
2()
and levels in the hierarchy which are at least as strong as T 2
2(). There is a general
feeling amongst those working in Bounded Arithmetic that a proof of the non-nite
axiomatisability of the rst order theory S2 (= T2) would be of great importance. An
important step in that direction would be to separate T 1
2;S2
2 and T 2
2. These theories
are only known to be dierent under an additional hypothesis from complexity theory.
In [9] T i
2 and Si+1
2 ;i1 were conditionally separated under the conjectural
assumption that the polynomial hierarchy (in complexity theory) does not collapse
on level i +2 . I n[ 8 ]S 2
2 and T 2
2 were conditionally separated under the conjectural
assumption Logspace
p
2 6=
p
3. However both these assumptions (generally believed
to be true) are far beyond current techniques. They both imply P 6=N P .
The relativised cases S2
2()a n dT 2
2(  ) were rst separated in [8]. I present new
proofs for these relativised cases. This is done by proving the following nitisation
principle:
Theorem 4.0.4 If   has an innite model (in the real world), there are structures
of T 1
2() in which   has a nite (=bounded) model.
I also get the following principle.
Theorem 4.0.5 Suppose that  := 9A  ( A;R) is a second order existential state-
ment. Suppose also that  is expressed solely by unspecied function and relation
symbols. Suppose that  has an innite model (in the real world) where the existential
quantier is not witnessed by any nite set. Then there are structures of T 1
2(),i n
which  has a nite model f1;2;:::;ng where the existential quantier is not witnessed
by any set A of size  log(n).
Since an understanding of the relativised cases, seems to precede an understanding
of the unrelativised cases these two results could perhaps be useful in separating T 1
2
from T 2
2 unconditionally.
Finally I prove a nitisation principle which can be used to separate the theories
S1
2()a n dT 1
2(  ).
Theorem 4.0.6 Suppose that  (;R) is a rst order statement which is expressed
solely by unspecied function and relation symbols. Suppose that in the real world
 (;R) holds in an innite model, where  denes a total linear ordering. Then
there are structures of S1
2() in which  (;R) holds in a nite (=bounded) model
and where  is the restriction of the order relation <.
10These theorems show that when we pass from the real universe to an universe which
only contains \feasible" sets, we have the heuristic translations, countable ! nite,
nite ! poly-logarithmic.
4.1 Further denitions and assumptions
Let L2(0;1;+;;f fast;f slow;=;) be a second order language where through some
basic axioms ffast and fslow are ensured to dene functions such that ffast is fast-
growing, and that fslow is slow growing. Further it is assumed that fslow is slower
than ffast is fast (!). More precisely assume:
(1) fslow;f fast are increasing.
(2) ffast x2.
(3) For any xed k, for all suciently large n fslow(f
(k)
fast(n))  n,w h e r e
f
( k )=ff::: f
| {z }
k
:
Denition 4.1.1 Af o r m u l a 2L 2is sharply bounded if each quantier appears in
the context 9x  fslow(t)o r8 xf slow(t), where t 2 TermL. A formula   2 L2 is
bounded if each quantier appears in a context 9x  t or 8x  t,w h e r et2TermL:
The class of b
i formulas and the class of b
i formulas are dened similar to the
earlier denition. |
Denition 4.1.2 T 1() denotes the second order theory consisting of a proper base
theory Basic together with EXT + b
1−comprehension+ b
1−IND. |
Given some additional relations ~ R we dene the rst order theory T 1(~ R) in the obvious
way. Notice that if ffast(<x ;y> ): =x]y and fslow(x): =j x j ;for a proper choice of
BASIC T 1() becomes T 1
2(). Furthermore notice that in this case
ffast(n)ffast(<n ;n> )=2 ( j n j 2)
and therefore j fslow(f
(k)
fast(n)) jjf slow(f
(k)
fast(<n ;n> )) j = j n j2k : Clearly for any
xed k and non-standard n, j n j2k<nso the consideration below applies to the
theory T 1
2().
Denition 4.1.3 Let <x 1 ;x 2;:::;xk > be a natural code of the k-tuple. For each
k we introduce quantiers 8k and 9k such that Qkx  ( x ) is shorthand notation for
Qx1Qx2:::Qxk  (<x 1;:::;xk >)w h e r e Q8or Q 9 . |
11Denition 4.1.4 Let Qkx < t::: be short-hand notation for Qx1 < t:::Qxk <t ,
when <x 1 ;x 2;:::;xk >= x.L e t  ( ~ x ) be a formula in some relational language
L(R1;R 2;:::;Rl). For a relation symbol S, the formula S(~ x) denotes the formula
which appears if each quantier in  is restricted to S. By <a(~ x) we understand the
formula which appears by restricting each quantier in  to [0;a). |
4.2 A version of the completeness theorem
As I have already pointed out, in the real mathematical universe it is not true that
any nite consistent set of rst-order sentences has a nite model. But there are
T 1
2()-universes where such a strong form of the completeness theorem holds.
Theorem 4.2.1 (Finitisation principle) Let (~ R) be a rst order property ex-
pressed in some relational language ~ L = L(~ R). Suppose that (n) is an arith-
metical rst order property expressible in the language L of arithmetic and sup-
pose that (n) holds for arbitrary large n. If (~ R) has a model then the theory
T 1(~ R)+9 n ( n )^ <n(~ R) h a sam o d e l .
First we shall make some preparation for the proof. Let ~ L and (~ R) be given as in
the theorem. We can assume that all relations are r-ary. (~ R) is assumed to have
an innite model, so by Skolem-L¨ owenheims Theorem, we can assume (~ R) has an
innite countable model Sst on a subset of the natural numbers. Furthermore, we can
assume Sst is a model with an underlying co-countable set, and if convenient, that an
extra unary relation symbol denoting membership of Sst is added to the language.
Let (M;S) be a countable non-standard model for the language ~ L(R): =L[~ L
which is elementarily equivalent to the standard model (N;S st). Use overspill to pick
a non-standard number n such that M j= (n).
Fix a non-standard number b0 <nsuch that bk
0 <nfor each standard number
k,a n ds u c ht h a tf slow(f
(k)
fast(n)) <b 0for every standard number k. Use overspill to
pick c 2 M non-standard such that fslow(c) <b 0a n ds u c ht h a tc>f
( k )
fast(n) for all
standard numbers k.
Denition 4.2.2 Let Pk;k2!; be the set of all partial (1-1)-maps  which have
dom() f 1 ; 2 ;:::;cg and ran()  M such that j dom() j bk
0,a n ds u c ht h a t
maps points in [0;n)t oS , and maps points in fn +1 ;n+2 ;:::;cg to M n S.
Let P = [k2!Pk and let (P;)b ePordered under inclusion. |
124.3 Generic maps
Let us now make a few basic denitions:
Denition 4.3.1 DPis called dense if 8 2P9 2Dsuch that   .
A subset S  M is quasi-denable in M if there is (x) 2 L(R!) such that
S = fx 2 M :( M ;!)j =(x)gwhere Rw is interpreted by !. We allow  to contain
parameters from M. |
Notice that in [1] the similar notion (just called denable) is S = fx 2 M j9 n2
R w  ( x;n)g, which would not work in our case because we cannot force formulas
in general to be equivalent to existential formulas. It should also be noticed that
any extension of the notion of quasi-denability which does not produce uncountably
many quasi-denable dense subsets of P, would work.
Example 4.3.2 The set P is quasi-denable. The initial segment [0;b !
0) is quasi-
denable.
Denition 4.3.3 GPis a generic lter if
(1) 8; 2G9 γ2Gγ^γ:
(2) 8 2G8 2P)2G :
(3) G\D6 =; for each quasi-denable dense set DP . |
Lemma 4.3.4 For every 0 2P9 GPgeneric such that 0 2G .
Proof: M is assumed to be countable so that there is at most countably many quasi-
denable sets DP .L i s tt h o s ea sD 1 ; D 2 ; D 3 ;:::.P i c k 1 0such that 1 2D 1,
pick 2  1 such that 2 2D 2, etc. and let G := f 2Pj9 j2!   j g : It is
straightforward to check that G is generic. 2
Denition 4.3.5 ~   M is generic if there is a generic GPsuch that ~  = [2G.
|
4.4 Sketch of proof
Now let me sketch the proof. We are given a non-standard model (M;S) e(N;S st)
in which the \structure" S we want to miniaturise is a part. We can assume that the
language contains the language of arithmetic together with extra relations, denoting
the relations in S.
13First, it is shown that some (actually any) generic ~  is a bijection from [0;c)t o
M , mapping [0;n)o n t oS . At this stage we also have to show certain lemmas about
the forcing relation in order to ensure it behaves well.
Second, it is shown that for some (actually any) generic map ~ ,( M ; ~  ) j =
9  − LNP; where 9-LNP denotes the least number principle for formulas in which
all quantiers are either existential (positive appearance) or are restricted to [0;b 0).
This part of the argument is based on the same idea as the proof of theorem 21 in
[12] (see also the introduction).
Third, it is noticed that the constants, relations and functions in the miniaturised
structure Smini := ~ −1(S)a r e9\8-denable in the generic model (M; ~ ).
Fourth, it is shown that each formula expressing a b
1- property about the minia-
turised model and numbers in [0;c), can be translated into an 9-formula. This
ensures that LNP holds for b
1-formulas with parameters in [0;c).
Finally a concrete model M is constructed as the smallest initial segment of [0;c)
which contains [0;n) and is closed under ffast.
4.5 The forcing relation
First we need to show some basic fact about generic maps. For simplicity we reduce
logical constants. So suppose that 8 :: 9 :and ^ ::_: . Extend the language
with names for the elements in M. Also extend the language ~ L(R) by an extra binary
relation symbol  . For sentences in this language ~ L(~ R;  ) we dene the forcing
relation inductively as follows:
 j`   if   does not contain  ; is atomic and true:
 j`  (a;b)i  ( a ) is dened and equals b:
 j`   _  i  j`  or  j` :
 j` 9x  ( x )i  f o r s o m e a 2 M j`   (a):
The forcing relation for negation satises:
 j` : i for no   ;  2 Pj`  :
4.6 Soundness of the forcing relation
We have to make sure that the forcing relation satises certain key properties. Except
for lemma 4.6.4 below, the reader who is familiar with forcing techniques could ignore
this section.
14Denition 4.6.1 Let (b0) be the set of formulas where all quantiers are restricted
to [0;b 0). |
Notice fslow(c) <b 0and therefore in the nal model all sharply bounded quantiers
are restricted to [0;b 0).
Lemma 4.6.2 (Forcing lemma) The forcing relation has the following properties:
Extension property: If  j`   and    then  j`  
Consistency: For no  2Pand for no  ,d o e sb o t hj`   and  j` :  hold.
Completeness: For each generic set GP , and for each   there is  2Gsuch
that  j`   or   j` : .
Soundness 1: If for a generic map ~ ; (M; ~ ) j=  , there is  2Gsuch that  j`  :
Soundness 2: If  j`   then (M; ~ ) j=   for any generic ~   :
Proof: Extension property: First notice that the claim holds for atomic formulas.
Clearly the extension lemma holds if     0 _  1,o ri f 9 y 0(y). Suppose
  :   0 ,j`  ,a n dis given. By denition for no 0  , 0 `  0.T h e
ordering  of the forcing conditions P is transitive for no 0  , 0 j`  0.B y
denition  j`  .
Consistency: Direct by the inductive denition.
Completeness: Let D := f :  j`   _:  g:Notice D is quasi-denable and dense
so there is 0 2G\D .
By denition either 0 j`   or 0 j` : .
Soundness 1 + 2: Both claims are proved simultaneously using induction on the
number of logical constants in  . The case where   is atomic is straightforward, and
s oi st h ec a s ew h e r e   0_  1or   9 y  0( y ).
If (M; ~ ) j= : , by induction there cannot be  2Gsuch that  j`  .B y
completeness there is  2Gsuch that  j` : .
If  j` :  but (M; ~ ) j=   for some generic map ~   ,t h e r ei s2Gsuch
that  j`  . By denition  and  have a common extension in P. By use of the
extension and the consistency property we get a contradiction. 2
Corollary 4.6.3 Any generic ~  is a bijection from [0;c)to M,which maps [0;n)onto
S.
Proof: Let a 2 [0;c] be an arbitrary element. Notice that Da := f : (a) is denedg
is both dense and quasi-denable. By denition there is 0 2D\G .
As 0  ~  this shows that ~  has domain [0;c). The other properties are proved
by a similar argument. 2
15Lemma 4.6.4 For each  (~ x) 2 (b0) there is k 2 ! which does not depend on the
parameters in  (~ x) and M-denable maps ~ x, !VD
~ x and ~ x, !VR
~ x such that
(1) Card(V
D
~ x )  b
k
0; Card(V
R
~ x )  b
k
0:
(2) For all  2Pwith Dom()  V
D
~ x and Ran()  V R
~ x :
 j`  (~ x)o rj` : (~ x):
(3) For all  2P; j V D
~ x[ V R
~ x j`  (~ x)i fj`  (~ x):
Proof: If  (x) is atomic and is of the form (u;v);(x;v);(u;x)o r ( x 1;x 2)l e t
V D
x := fug;VD
x := fug;VD
x := fvg or V D
x1;x2 := fx1g, and similar let V R
x := fvg,
V R
x := fvg, V R
x := fvg and V R
x1;x2 := fx2g.
If     0 _  1 let V D
~ x := V
D;0
~ x [ V
D;1
~ x ,a n dl e tV R
~ x := V
R;0
~ x [ V
R;1
~ x .I f 9 u
b 0  0( u;~ x)l e tVD
~ x :=
S
ub0 V
D;0
u;~ x and V R
~ x :=
S
ub0 V
R;0
u;~ x and notice that Card(V
D=R
~ x ) 
b0 bk
0 = b
k+1
0 for some k 2 !.I f :   0letV
D=R
~ x := V
D=R;0
~ x :
Now we prove (2) and (3) by induction on the number of logical constants in  (~ x).
If  (~ x) is atomic it is easy to check (2) and (3). Suppose  6j` 9x  b0  (x)w h e r e
 2(b0).
We need to show that jV j` :9x  b0  (x). Conversely suppose that for some
  jV,  j` 9x  b0  (x). By denition for some a  b0;j`  (a), and by
induction jV D
a [V R
a j`  (a): Now as jV D
a [V R
a = jV D
a [V R
a jV D
a [V R
a j` 9x  b0  (x)
and then by the extension lemma jV j` 9x  b0  (x) ,w h i c hi si nc o n t r a d i c t i o nt o
the assumption  6j` 9x  b0  (x). 2
4.7 Some properties of the generic objects
We have already dened 9 to be the set of formulas in which all quantiers are
either existential which appear positively or are restricted to [0;b 0) (Sharply bounded
quantiers). According to our plan in order to prove the main theorem we have to
prove that some (any) generic ~  satises the 9 -LNP scheme. Let 9
Strict be the
set of formulas 9~ x (~ x), where   2 (b0) and where there are no restrictions on the
parameters in  . First we prove that:
Lemma 4.7.1 For any generic map ~ , (M; ~ ) satises the 9
Strict-LNP scheme.
Proof: Let  (z) 9 ~ x 1(~ x;z)b eg i v e n . (   12(b0)). Let 0 2P kbe given such
that 0 j`  (a)f o rs o m ea2M .L e ta 02Mbe the smallest element such that for
16some   0 with  2P k + r(for suitable r), and some ~ x0,  j`  1(~ x0;a 0): This
denition makes sense because the forcing relation is denable for (b0)-formulas.
(By lemma 4.6.4). Let D be the set of 0 2Pwhich are either incompatible to 0 or
extensions of a  with the property just mentioned above. D is quasi-denable and
dense so there is  2D\G . Clearly  j`  (a0) .A l lt h a tr e m a i n si st oc h e c kt h a ti fr
is chosen properly (lemma 4.6.4) there is no a1 <a 0and 0   with 0 j`  (a1). 2
4.8 A minor problem
Now we want to prove that for some (any) generic ~ ,( M ;~  ) actually satises the
9-LNP scheme. It should be noticed that because of the presence of the generic
object ~  it is not entirely clear why any 9-formula should be equivalent to an 9
Strict
formula.
Let  (z)b eag i v e n9 -formula. Let us try to follow the same strategy as in the
proof of lemma 4.7.1 above. Without loss of generality we can assume that
 (z) 9 x 08 u 0b 09 x 18 u 1b 0:::9xk(~ x;~ u;z)
where  2 (b0). Find smallest z0 such that there are a0,a1;0;a 1;1;:::;a1;b,
and a2;0;0;a 2;0;1;::::;a2;0;b0 and a2;1;0;a 2;1;1;a 2;1;2;:::;a2;1;b0 :::;a2;b0;b0, ...
:::ak;b0;b0;:::b0 | {z }
kb 0
0 s
and   0 in Pk+r such that for any choice u0  b0;u 1 b 0 ; ::: uk  b0
 j` (a0;a 1;u0;a 2;u0;u1;:::;ak;u0;:::;uk−1;u 0;u 1;:::uk−1;z 0)
Again if there is any z0 satisfying the condition, there is also a smallest such z0.
This holds for each choice of r 2 !. As a minor technical problem we need to
show (what might be obvious to the reader) that if  is chosen as above, for no
0   we can have 0 j`  (z1)f o rs o m ez 1<z 0 .N o w i n g e n e r a l ( M ; ~  )h a sm o r e
denable functions on [0;b 0)t h a nM . This is because for each formula (x;)a n d
each generic map ~ ,  could be eliminated (i.e. there was a formula  (x) such that
8x 2 [0;b 0) (x;) ,  (x) in the case where fslow(x): =l o g ( x )), then induction
w o u l dh o l du pt ob 0log(c) and therefore up to c, which would be a contradiction.
Essentially we have to check that  (z1) can not have a sequence of witnesses which
was not denable in M. In the case where  (x)w a sa9 
Strict-formula there was no
such problem because the search in M was only a search for standard nitely many
witnesses. We have to show that there cannot be such a z1. This is essentially done
17by showing that in the case of 9-formulas for any generic ~  there is an M denable
sequence of witnesses.
For  29 we make the following denition:
Denition 4.8.1  j`D 8x  b0 (x) i 8x  b0  j`D (x).
 j`D 9x(x) i 9xj`D (x)
 j`D :: i  j`D . |
Notice that for  29 if  j`D  for each extension (not necessarily a generic exten-
sion!) ~  of  then (M; ~ ) j= :
Observation 4.8.2 For each 0 2P, each k 2 ! and each   29 the set f< ;x> :
 0^2P k^j`D  (x)g is denable in M.
The problem we are concerned with at this stage is whether it is possible for given
0 and  2 (b0)t oh a v e 0with  j` 8x  b9y ( x;y) but for no   0;2
P r:j`D 8x  b9y ( x;y)?
Assume that there is   0 such that  j` 8x  b09y ( x;y):
Claim: There is an extension 1   such that 8x  b09y 1j` (x;y). Pick for
each j  b0; jsuch that   0  1  :::b0 = 1 and such that j j` 9y(j;y):
Furthermore by lemma 4.6.4 each extension can be chosen to be of size  bl
0 for some
xed l 2 ! (l c a nb ec h o s e nt ob et h en u m b e ro f\ 8 xb 0"q u a n t i  e r si n ). So 1
is a  bl+1
0 extension of . By lemma 4.6.4 for each x  b0 and witness y(x)t h e r ei s
as e tV x;y(x) with cardinality  bl
0 for some xed standard l.L e tV:=
S
xb0 Vx;y(x):
Notice that Card(V )  b
l+1
0 and that 8x  b09y 1 ; j V j`  (x;y): Let  =(  1) j V and
notice that  j`D 8x  b09y ( x;y): We have just proved the rst part of the next
lemma:
Lemma 4.8.3 Let  (z)=8 xb 09 y ( x;y;z) where  2 (b0). There is r 2 ! such
that if   0 is the br
0-extension of 0 with the smallest z0 such that
 j`D 8x  b09y ( x;y;z0)
then for any generic model (M; ~ ) with ~   0 (M; ~ ) j=  (z0) ^8 z<z 0:   ( z ) :
More generally Let  (z)=9 x 0 8 u 0b 0 9 x 1 8 u 1b 0 ::::9xk (~ u;~ x;z) where  2
(b0): Then there is a standard number r which does not depend on the parameters
in   such that if   0 is the br
0-extension of 0 with the smallest z0 satisfying
 j`D  (z0) then for any generic model (M; ~ ) with ~   0
(M; ~ ) j=  (z0) ^8 z<z 0:   ( z ) :
18Proof: Let 0 be given. Assume that for some   0
 j` 8x1  b09y18x2  b0:::9xk (~ x;~ y)
but that for no   0;2P r j`D 8x1  b09y1:::(~ x;~ y): There is 0   such
that 8x1  b09y1 0 j` 8x2  b09y2::::(~ x; ~ y): By induction on k, we can assume
that we have already proved that if for some xed x1 and y1;  ;  j` 8x2 
b09y2:::(~ x; ~ y); c a nb ec h o s e nt ob ea nb
l + k − 1
0 -extension, where l is the number of
8-quantiers in .T h e r ei s 00  0 (making b2
0 b
k+l−2
0 -extensions of 0), such that
8x1  b09y18x2  b09y2 
00 j` 8x3  b0:::(~ x; ~ y)
Continuing like this, after k steps we obtain    such that  j`D  : We can not
use  as  in the lemma, because  (and therefore ) could be too large. But by
lemma 4.6.4, there are bk
0 sets Vx1;y(x1);x2;y(x2);:::;xk;y(xk) each with  bl
0 elements where
l can be taken to be the number of 8-quantiers in .L e t
V:=
[
x1b0
[
x2b0
:::
[
xkb0
Vx1;y(x1);:::;xk;y(xk):
Notice that Card(V )  b
k+l
0 .L e t:= 
jV and notice that  j`D  : This contradicts
the assumption. 2
Corollary 4.8.4 For any generic map ~  (M; ~ ) j= 9−LNP
Proof: Let ~  be an arbitrary generic map. We need to show that (M; ~ ) j= 9x (x) )
9x0  x8z<x 0  ( x 0 )^:   ( z ). Suppose (M; ~ ) j=  (a)f o rs o m ea2M(otherwise
there is nothing to prove). According to the completeness property there is 0  ~ 
such that 0 2 P and 0 j`  (a). Assume 0 2P k .C o n s i d e r DPdened by
D := f j  6 0 _ (  0 ^9 xj`D  (x) ^8 y<x ( 8  0 06j`D  (y)))g:
From what has already been proved it follows that D is well dened, dense and quasi-
denable. For any generic GPthere are 1 2D\G . By lemma 4.8.3 for any
~    (in particular ~  )( M ;~  )j =9 x (x) )9 x 0x 8 z<x 0  ( x 0 )^:   ( z ) :As
1  ~  we are done. 2
4.9 Proof of the rst nitisation principle
The previous section has given us a \generic model" (M; ~ ) which satises the 9-LNP
scheme. Clearly ~  induces a miniaturised version of S on [0;n). Constants, relations
and functions on S correspond to constants, relations and functions on [0;n). Now I
prove the important fact that all the miniaturised relations etc. are 9\8 -denable
in (M; ~ ).
19For each relation R  Sr (with quantier-free denition in M), we dene the
corresponding miniaturised relation Rmini \existentially" by:
f(x1;x 2;:::;xr) j9 z 1;z 2;:::;zr ^i=r
i=0 ~ (xi;z i)^R(z 1;z 2;:::;zr)g:
Notice that Rmini also has a \universal" denition:
f(x1;x 2;:::;xr) j8 z 1;z 2;:::;zr ^i=r
i=0 ~ (xi;z i))R(z 1;z 2;:::;zr)g:
Add the miniaturised relations to the language. Consider the sub-language Lmini
which contains L and names for the miniaturised constants, relations and functions.
Lemma 4.9.1 If  (x) 2 Lmini is a b
1-formula with all quantiers restricted to [0;c),
there is a 9-formula  (x) such that:
fx  c :( M ; ~  ) j =   ( x ) g = f x  c :( M ; ~  ) j =  
 ( x ) g :
Proof: Let  (x) 2 Lmini be a given b
1 property. Replace each appearance of a
"miniaturised" relation Rmini by either the 9-denition or the 8-denition according
to whether the Rmini appears positively or negatively in  (x). Notice that this gives
an 9-formula  (x) which satises the lemma. 2
Now we are ready to construct a model of T 1
2() in which there is a bounded
sub-structure Smini on [0;n)w h e r e ( n ) such that Smini j= <n(~ R). We have already
got a countable model M of true arithmetic in which a possibly unbounded model of
(~ R)i sc o d e d .W eh a v en;b0;c2Mas above. Let ~  be an arbitrary generic map, as
described earlier. Let
M

~  = fx  c : 9k 2 !x < f
( k )
slow(n)g:
Let ^ R be the set of all Lmini-denable relations on [0;n). It follows from what has
already been proved that (M; ^ R) j= b
1-IND scheme, hence because of corollary 3.4.5
there is an expansion of ^ R to ^ S  ^ R such that (M; ^ S) j= T 1(). As second order
existence statements are absolute with respect to expansions, we have proved the
main theorem in the T 1()-case.
Corollary 4.9.2 Let S be a countable mathematical structure which can be encoded
in a non-standard model M which satises true arithmetic. There is a model of T 1
2()
in which S appears as a bounded set.
Notice that our results hold in the special case where T 1() is the second order
theory which consists of
1) Induction for existential formulas.
2) The 8\9 -comprehension axiom scheme.
205 Separating T 1
2() and S2
2()
In the process as a by-product we have obtained a new proof of the separation of the
theories T 1
2()a n dS 2
2(  ).
Theorem 5.0.3 For any generic map ~  (M
~ ; ~ S~ ) j= T 1
2().
If S denes two disjoint innite sets, then for any generic map ~  (M
~ ; ~ S~ ) 6j=
S2
2().
Proof: The rst part of the theorem has already been proven. It follows from the
examples below that the second part holds at least for some constructions (i.e. for
some S). To prove the second part let U(x) be a new unary predicate symbol which
holds exactly in one component of S.L e tU mini denote the corresponding predicate
in Lmini.P u tf slow :=j x j and ffast := xjxj. Consider the formula
A(z): =9 u 1<u 2nu 2−u 1b z8 x2[ u 1;u 2)U mini(x):
Clearly A(k) is valid for all standard k and hence, by overspill, A(z) holds for some
non-standard z (and z j n j). But this is a contradiction as for any given interval of
length <b ! the set of  2Psuch that  maps an element of S n U into it, is dense
and quasi-denable.
According to [5] b
2-PIND is sucient to ensure the validity of b
2-LMAX principle
which in turn implies the validity of the b
2-overspill just used. 2
Notice that if S is an innite (co-countable) set with no additional structure then
(M
~ ; ~ S~ ) j= S2(): This shows that the second part of the theorem becomes false if
there is no condition on S.
Corollary 5.0.4 T 1
2() 6= S2
2():
This is a new proof of the result which was rst proved in [8].
6 Some examples
Example 6.0.5 Fix p  2. There is an innite model A where \R denes a partition
of A into disjoint p-subsets". Let (n)  \n is not divisible by p'.
According to the rst principle T 1() 6` Count(p).
In [2] and [16] it is shown that this holds for much stronger theories.
21Example 6.0.6 According to the rst principle:
(1) T 1() 6` "every linear ordering R (of a nite set) has an isolated point".
(2) T 1() 6` "every linear ordering R (of a nite set) is discrete".
(3) T 1() 6` "every linear ordering R (of a nite set) is a well ordering".
By the results below in all cases T 1() can be replaced by S2
2().
Notice that example 6.0.6 shows (using T 1
2()  WOA, Proposition 8.0.9) that the
well ordering axiom for arbitrary linear orderings (WOA) R does not follow from
WOA.
7 Another principle
The second nitisation principle says that for any given r 2 N if some second order
existential relational property ~ P  P(~ R;X) is only witnessed by innite sets (in
the real universe), there are models of T 1
2() in which there is an n and relations
~ R  [0;n) such that no subset X  [0;n) with size  log
r
2(n)w i t n e s sP(~ R;X).
Theorem 7.0.7 (Finitisation principle) Let  9 X (~ R;X) be a second order
existential formula where   is a rst order formula in the language L(~ R;X;=).L e t
k 2 Nbe a given natural number. In general (1) implies (2):
(1) There is a countable model S of the language L(~ R;=), such that for no nite
set X  S; S j=  (~ R;X):
(2) T 1()+\ 9 n 8 X[0;n)C a r d ( X )(log(n))k ):   <n(~ R;X)"h a sam o d e l .
This principle states that if a second order existential property has (in the real
universe) a countable model where the existential quantier is not nitely witnessed
then it is consistent with T 1
2()( a n db yt h er e s u l t sb e l o wS 2
2(  )) that there is a nite
model where the existential quantiers is not \polylog"-witnessed.
Example 7.0.8 In the real world there is a binary tree with no nite branch. By the
second nitisation principle T 1
2 is consistent with the existence of a tree T  [0;n),
which has no branch (coded by a number) of length  log
k
2(n)".
In the real word there is a vector space over Z2 with no nite basis, so by the
second principle there exists a model of T 1
2() in which there exists a vector space
V  [0;n)with no basic (coded by a number) of size  log
k
2(n)".
Proof: Proved by a construction very similar to the proof of the rst nitisation
principle. Pick S according to (1). Choose S as a countable model in the standard
22model on say the even numbers. Extend the standard model to an elementary equiva-
lent countable non-standard model. Pick non-standard numbers b0 <n<cas above.
Consider the same set of forcing conditions (P;) as above. The forcing conditions
ensure that each generic ~  maps small (i.e.  bk
0 points) M-denable sets to \small"
M-denable sets. The map ~  induces a miniaturised structure Smini with underlying
set [0;n). For each M-denable subset B  [0;n);A:= ~ −1(B)c a nn o twitness
 (~ R;A) because the set A has cardinality  bk
0 which is nite in the model M.A si n
the proof of the rst principle without any complications we construct a model T 1
2()
where  <n(~ R;X) is not witnessed by any set A of size  b!
0. 2
8 The well ordering axiom in S1
2.
The well ordering axiom (WOA) is the principle:
WOA 8X(X 6= ;)9 y ( y2X^8 z<y z62 X))
WOA says that \<" well orders any set X, and should not be confused with the
stronger principle WOA stating that any linear ordering of a bounded set is a well
ordering.
Proposition 8.0.9 (Suggested by A.J.Wilkie) WOA is equivalent to T 1
2() in
models of S1
2()
Proof: T 1
2() ) WOA: To reach a contradiction let (M; ^ S) j= T 1
2()+: WOA.
There is R 2 ^ S such that R 6= ; a n ds u c ht h a t( M ;^ S )j =8 y ( y2R)9 z<yz2R ).
As R 6= ; there is u0 2 R such that:
()( M ; ^ S ) j = 8 y  u 0 ( y 2 R )9 z<y 2R ) :
Let Y = fx 2 M : 9z 2 Rz < x ^ x  u 0 gM :Notice that Y is b
1-denable in
M with set parameter R (Y is not required to belong to ~ S). As b
1-LNP , b
1-I N D ,
and as Y is non-empty, there is a minimal x0 2 Y . By denition of Y there is z<x 0
such that z 2 R.B y(  ) this contradicts the minimality of x0:
WOA ) T 1
2():L e t( M ;^ S )j =S 1
2 (  ) + WOA be an arbitrary model. Let   2
b
0 (= b
0) be an arbitrary formula with possible set variables ~ Z 2 ^ S. It is enough
to prove that the b
1-denable set Y := fx 2 M : 9z  t(x)  (x;z; ~ Z)gMhas a
smallest element if it is not empty. Pick u0 2 Y . To this end consider
(w): 9 w 1u 09 w 2u 0w=w 1u 0+w 2^  ( w 1;w 2;~ Z):
23As  2 b
1 Rb;u0 :f wbj ( w ) g2^ Sfor any b;u 2 M.C h o o s eb such that for
each pair (x;z)w i t hzt ( x )a n dxu 0;( x;z)  b: A c c o r d i n gt oW O AR b;u0 has a
smallest element w0.L e ty 0be the unique element with y0  u0  w0 < (y0 +1 )u 0,
and notice that M j= y0 =m i n ( Y) :We used the fact that strict-b
1-LNP is equivalent
to b
1-IND over S1
2() . So to prove Proposition 8.0.9 all that remains is to prove
this, and the equivalence of b
1-IND and strict-b
1-LNP over S1
2(). Both these facts
follow from [4],[7]. 2
8.1 A nitisation principle for S1
2()
As already proved T 1
2() is equivalent to the well ordering axiom WOA over the
theory S1
2(). In this section I show that S1
2() does not prove this axiom, and thus
as a corollary we get a new proof of the separation result S1
2() 6= T 1
2(). Parts of
the argument are very similar to the proof of the two previous principles so I only
emphasise the new ideas in the construction.
Theorem 8.1.1 (Finitisation principle for S1
2()) Let  (;R) be a sentence in
the rst order language L(;R;=). Suppose that  (;R) has an innite model S
where  denes a total linear ordering. Then 9n9U  [1;n]  U(<;R) holds in some
models of S1
2().
Proof: I put the emphasis on the new ideas. Let (N;S N;R N) be an expansion of
the standard model N to an innite model of S,w h e r eRS r,a n dw h e r e  (  ;R)
holds. Let (M;S large;R large) be an elementary equivalent (in a language expanded by
relation symbols for Rlarge and Slarge) non-standard model. Let n 2 M be a non-
standard number, and let I  M be the initial sequent dened by
I
 := fm 2 M : 9t term m<t ( n ) g :
A b
1( I  )-formula ,i sa b
1-formula where all parameters belong to I.N o t i c et h a t
all quantiers in such a  also are restricted to I.C h o o s eb 0such that I < 2b0,a n d
such that b!
0 <n . Notice that sharply bounded quantiers in a b
1(I)-formula are
bound by b0.
We want to construct U  [1;n]a n dRU rsuch that  U(<;R) is forced true,
and such that the polynomial induction scheme
((0) ^8 x ( ( b
x
2
c ))( x ))) )8 x(x)
is forced true for all b
1(I)-formulas .L e t < 1 ( x ) ;a 1 >;< 2;a 2 >;:::: be an
enumeration of the countably many pairs < j ( x ) ;a j > where j(x)i sa b
1 ( I  )-
formula with one free variable (namely x), and where aj 2 I.
24Let U0 = W0 = R0 = ;.C h o o s ed 0<e 02Mwith e0 − d0 >b !
0,a n de 0< n
b 0.L e t
f 0=; :
In general after stage j we have constructed Uj;W j [1;n]a n dR jU r
j,s u c h
that Uj \ Wj = ;.T h e m a p f jmaps Uj bijectively onto a subset of Slarge,s u c h
that <u 1;::;ur >2 Rj precisely when Rlarge(f(u1);:::;f(ur)). Furthermore, we have
j Uj j j  b0, j Wj j j  b0,a n d[ d j;e j] such that ej − dj >b !
0. The points in Uj are
very sparsely distributed in the sense that 8u1 6= u2 2 Uj j u2 − u1 j ej.
Now consider < j +1(x);a j+1 >. Our aim is to force
j+1(0) ^8 x (  j+1(b
x
2
c) ) j+1(x)) ) j+1(aj+1)
true. Let a1
j+1 := aj+1;::::;a
r+1
j+1 := b
ar
j+1
2 c;::: for r d log(aj+1)e.N o w f o r e a c h
u 2 [ d j ;e j] dene the number l(u) 2 M as the largest number ( log(aj+1)) such that
there are extensions U0
j+1  Uj;W 0
j +1  Wj,a n dR 0
j +1  Rj, such that
(1) (U0
j+1;R 0
j+1) are isomorphic by an extension f0
j+1  fj to a subset of Slarge.
(2) The elements in U0
j+1 has pairwise distance  u
(3) j U0
j+1 j (j +1 )b 0
(4) j W 0
j+1 j (j +1 )b 0.
(5) At least l(u)o ft h e b
1( I )-formulas (a1
j+1);:::;(a
dlog(aj+1)e
j+1 ) are forced true.
Now because l takes less than b0 values, there must be an interval [dj+1;e j+1]  [dj;e j]
such that l is constant on this interval, and such that ej+1−dj+1 >b !
0. Choose such an
interval, and extend Uj;W j and Rj by letting Uj+1 := U0
j+1;W j +1 := W0
j+1;R j +1 :=
R0
j+1,a n df j +1 := f0
j+1 where these extensions correspond to the case where u = ej+1.
Proceed with the construction in this way:
Let U := [j2! Uj and let R = [j2! Rj and notice R  Ur. It is not hard to show
that f = [j2! fj denes a bijection from the miniaturised model U on [1;n]t ot h e
large model Slarge. This ensures that  U(<;R) holds in the generic model.
The b
1(I) polynomial induction schema is forced true. To see this suppose
contrarily that for some k 2 ! in the generic model we have
k(0) ^8 x (  k( b
x
2
c )) k( x )) ^:  k( a k) :
In stage k in the construction we have forced a maximum number of the b
1(I)-
formulas k(a1
k); k(a 2
k);::;k(a
j
k);::;k(0) true. As obviously k(ak) cannot have been
forced true, there must be j<d log(ak)e such that k(a
j+1
k ) is already forced true
(after stage k) while k(a
j
k) is not forced true at this stage (here we are using that
the search procedure, for xed u 2 [dk;e k], is M-denable). Could it be that k(a
j
k)
get forced true at a later stage k0 >k ? No, because if this were the case for some
u 2 [dk;e k];l would take a larger value than l(ek), which would be a contradiction.
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Corollary 8.1.2 There are models of S1
2() in which WOA fails.
Proof: Let  (): =8 x 9 yyx: This sentence holds in an innite model (in the real
world), so by theorem 8.1.1 the sentence 8x 2 U9y 2 Uy<xholds in some models
of S1
2(). 2
This gives a new proof of the separation rst proved in [10]
Corollary 8.1.3 S1
2() 6= T 1
2().
9 Lifting the nitisation principles
Now I show that both nitisation principles for T 1
2() hold for the theory S2
2() but
both fail to hold for T 2
2(). This, in particular separates the theories S2
2()a n dT2
2(  ).
In this I rely heavily on a proof sketch ed by J.Krajicek (personal communication).
The proof relies again strongly on S.Buss' result [5], that Si+1
2 ()i s8  b
i +1-conservative
over T i
2().
Theorem 9.0.4 The rst nitisation principle holds if T 1() is replaced by S2
2()
Proof: To get a contradiction assume that (R) 8 x 1 9 y 1 ::::8xk9yk ~ (~ x;~ y;R)( ~ 
is quantier free) does have an innite model, but S2
2() `8 n(  ( n ))8 R<
n :  <n(R)): Consider the skolemisation
~ (x1;F 1(x 1);x 2;F 2(x 1;x 2);:::;xk;F k(x 1;x 2;:::;xk);R)
of (R). By the rst nitisation principle T 1
2()+9 n(  ( n )^9 R<n 9 F 1;::9F k <n
8 ~ xn~  ( x 1;F 1(x 1)::::;R)) is consistent.
Add an extra constant  n, extra function symbols  F1;  F2;::;  Fk and an extra re-
lational symbol  R to the language. Call this language ~ L2. The rst order theory
T 1
2( n;  F1;:::;  Fk;  R)+8 x n~ ( x 1; F 1( x 1) ;:::;  Fk(~ x);  R) is consistent.
Now by theorem 3.5.3 S2
2( n;  F1;::::;  Fk;  R)+8 x n~  ( x 1; F 1( x 1) ;:::;  Fk(~ x);  R)i s
consistent. As a skolemisation of  implies  (even in pure predicate logic) this
contradicts our initial assumption about S2
2(). 2
This give us the following:
Corollary 9.0.5 Let (~ R) be any rst order property in some relational language
~ L := L(~ R). Then the following are equivalent:
(a) Predicate logic ` (~ R)
26(b) T
1() `8 n <n(~ R)
(c) S
2
2() `8 n <n(~ R):
Proof: Let T be T1()o rS 2
2(  ). Assume that (~ R). Assume that T does not prove
8n <n(~ R). There exists a non-standard model M of T in which :<n(~ R)h o l d si n
some initial segment [0;n), so ([0;n);~ R) j = :(~ R): But then by the completeness
theorem (~ R) is not provable in predicate logic.
Contrarily if predicate logic does not prove (~ R)t h e r ei sam o d e lSof :(~ R). If
S is nite certainly 8n <n(~ R)d o e sn o th a v eaT-proof (because T is consistent). If
S is innite, by the nitisation principle 9n :<n(~ R) is consistent with T. 2
10 Separating S2
2() and T 2
2()
Theorem 10.0.6 The statement \Every linear ordering of an interval has a smallest
element" is provable in T 2
2(),b u tn o tprovable in S2
2().
The statement \There is no dense linear ordering of an interval of length  2"i s
provable in T 2
2() but not provable in S2
2().
Proof: The second part of the claim follows from the nitisation principle for S2
2().
To prove the rst part let (M; ^ S) j= T 2
2() be an arbitrary model. Assume that R is
an M-denable linear ordering of an interval [0;n)f o rs o m en2M .L e t
Y=f b2[0;n): 9 a 0b 8 xbx R a 0)x=a 0g :
Notice that Y is b
2-denable and that 0 2 Y and b 2 Y ) b +12Y for b<n .A s
( M ;^ S ) j = b
2−IND; (n−1) 2 Y . By denition of Y , R has a smallest element. The
second part follows from the rst part. 2
This gives us a new proof of
Corollary 10.0.7 S2
2() 6= T 2
2().
The following were proved in [10]. Above we have obtained a new proof of the
second part of the theorem.
Theorem 10.0.8 The weak pigeon-hole principle (WPHP) is provable in T 2
2(),b u t
not provable in S2
2().
Proof: The second part of the theorem has already been proved. The rst part
follows from the fact that S3
2()i s8  b
3 -conservative over T 2
2(), that WPHP is a
8b
2-formula and from the following sub claim:
27Lemma 10.0.9 WPHP is provable in S3
2().
Proof: A careful analysis of the S2-proof in [12] (see also [8]) of WPHP shows that
the proof is actually a S3
2(R)-proof. 2
11 Lifting the second principle
For the sake of completeness let me sketch how the second nitisation principle can
be lifted to S2
2().
Theorem 11.0.10 Let  9 X  ( ~ R;X) be a second order existential formula where
  can be any rst order formula in the relational language L(~ R;=).L e tk2 Nbe a
given natural number. In general (1) implies (2):
(1) There is a countable model S of the language L(~ R;=), such that for no nite
set X  S; S j= (~ R;X).
(2) S2
2()+\ 9 n 8 X[0;n)C a r d ( X )( log(n))k !:  <n(~ R;X)"h a sam o d e l .
Proof:(sketch)Essentially we lift the result as we did for the rst nitisation principle.
Suppose that S2
2() `8 n 8 ~ R[0;n)9b  <n(~ R;Seq(b)) where  <n 8 x 1<n 9 x 2<
n:::9x2r <n~  ( ~ x;n; ~ R;Seq(b)) with ~  quantier free.
We have already proved the theorem in the T 1
2()-case, so
T
1
2()+8 ~ x<n 8 b :~  ( x 1; F 1( x 1) ;x 3;::::;  Fr;n;~ R;Seq(b))
is consistent, where the language is extended by extra relation symbols  n; ~ R;  F1;:::;  Fr.
By S.Buss' conservation result, (theorem 3.5.3), which also works in this case where
we have added extra function symbols to the language
S
2
2()+8 ~ x< n 8 b:~  ( x 1; F 1( x 1) ;::::; n; ~ R;Seq(b))
is consistentinthis extendedlanguage. Clearlythiscontradicts our initial assumption.
2
Notice the following phenomenon:
Corollary 11.0.11 If
9X  [0;n)C a r d ( X )(log(n))
k1 ^ <n(~ R;X)
holds in the real world for some constant k1 but does not hold for some other constant
k2 <k 1,S 2
2(  )does not prove the formula for any constant k.
2812 Some applications
By use of the second nitisation principle we get the following theorem. The last case
(3) shows that the theorem is not entirely a curiosity.
Theorem 12.0.12 If k is a natural number, then S2
2() does not prove any of the
following statements:
(1) \Every vector space V  [0;n)over Z2 has a basis of size  log
k(n)".
(2) \Every binary tree T  [0;n)has a branch of length  log
k(n)".
(3) \Every total irreﬂexively oriented graph on [0;n) has a dominating set of size
 log
k(n)".
On the other hand T 2
2() proves (1)-(2).
At present, it is not known whether T 2
2() ` (3). A proof of even S2() ` (3) would
have interesting consequences. (See [13] and [10] for more details).
Proof: The rst part of the theorem follows from the second nitisation principle (in
case (1) from a slightly modied version of the principle) and the facts:
There is an (innite) vector space with no nite basic.
There is an (innite) binary tree with no nite branch.
There is an (innite) irreﬂexively oriented graph with no nite dominating set.
To prove the last part of the theorem, assume V is a vector space on [0;n)w i t h
no coded basic. Pick independent vectors v1;v 2;:::;vblog(2n)c+1 and get a b
1-denable
injective map from [0;2n)t o[ 0 ;n). This violates WPHP which are provable in T 2
2()
by [4] (or [8]).
Finally T 2
2() proves that every tree T  [0;n) has a coded branch. Let T  :=
fx 2 T : 9bbcodes a path of length b log(n)c+1 from the root to xg: Notice that
T  also have the b
1-denition: T  := fx 2 T : 8bbcodes a path from the root to x
and the length of the path is b log(n)c +1 g :Dene a b
1-relation by F(x)=yi
8bbcodes a path x1;x 2;:::;xr from the root to x, and bit(y;j)=1$x j is a right
son. Again we get a contradiction to the WPHP in [11]. 2
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